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Financial  derivatives  have  harmed  or destroyed 
numerous  financial  firms,  nonfinancial  firms,  and 
municipalities  in 1994 and 1995.  This paper  discusses 
the  dangers  of derivatives  and also  their benefits.  It 
then  considers  policies  that will  maintain  the benefits 
while  containing  the risks.  These  include  improving  the 
accounting  framework  used  to disclose  derivatives 
transactions,  increasing  transparency  between  dealers  and 
end-users,  and reducing  legal  uncertainties  between 
countries.  This paper  also  argues  that  the government 
needs  to make  a concerted  effort  to acquire  more 
information  concerning  the dangers  that derivatives 
trading  pose  to the financial  system.  If such  a study 
revealed  that the systemic  risks  are too high,  then 
remedial  legislation  regulating  the safety  and 
soundness  of nonbank  derivatives  dealers  would  be 
required.  Until such a study  is conducted,  the 
government  should  seek  to improve  the in-house  risk 
management  techniques  used by major players  in the 
derivatives  market. I. INTRODUCTION 
Financial  derivatives  have  harmed  or  destroyed  numerous 
economic  agents  during  the  last year.  Gibson  Greetings  lost  $20 
million,  Proctor  & Gamble  lost  $157 million,  Orange  County  went 
bankrupt,  and  Barings  Bank  lost  $1  billion.  How  should  policy 
makers  respond  to such devastating  losses? 
This  question  has  had  no  shortage  of  responses.  Alan 
Greenspan,  chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  argued  that 
derivatives  risks are best regulated by private parties,  subject  to 
the discipline  of the marketplace.  Representative  Henry Gonzalez, 
former  chairman  of  the  House  Banking  Committee,  contended  that 
tighter  regulation  of  security  firms,  insurance  companies,  and 
other participants  in the derivatives  market  is necessary.  Warren 
Buffet,  chairman  of Berkshire  Hathaway,  said that every CEO should 
be  required  in his  or her  annual  report  to  state  that  he  or  she 
understands  every derivative  contract that the company  has entered 
into.  Charles  Bowsher,  head of the Government  Accounting  Office, 
expressed  concern  about  commercial  banks  using  taxpayer-insured 
deposits  to  invest  in derivatives  for their  own accounts. 
This  paper  enters  the  fray  by  also  recommending  policy 
responses,  after first considering  the benefits  and the dangers  of 
derivatives.  The  beneficial  functions  that  derivatives  perform 
include  hedging  market  risks,  increasing  the  value  of  firms,  and 
improving  the efficiency  of price  signals.  Their  dangers  include 
bankrupting  individual  firms,  threatening  the  stability  of  the 
financial  system,  and  fostering  dishonesty  in  the  highly 
competitive  financial  services  industry.  To maintain  the benefits 2 
while containing  the risks government  officials should push for the 
development  of  a consistent  accounting  framework  for  derivatives 
transactions,  greater  transparency  between  dealers  and end-users, 
and  the  reduction  of  legal  uncertainties  between  countries. 
Whether  new legislation  regulating  the safety and soundness  of all 
OTC derivatives  dealers  is necessary  is a more difficult  question. 
This  paper  argues  that to answer this the government  should  first 
obtain  more  information.  It  should  follow  a  recommendation  by 
Eugene Rotberg  (1995) to place the major players  in the derivatives 
market  under  oath  and determine  exactly  what  risks  their  trading 
activities  pose to the financial system.  This information  could be 
used  to  determine  whether  remedial  legislation  covering  nonbank 
derivatives  dealers  is necessary  and if so what kind of regulation 
is appropriate.  Until  such a study  is conducted,  the  government 
should push the major players in the derivatives  markets to improve 
their  own  in-house  risk management  techniques. 
The  next  Section  focuses  on  the  benefits  of  derivatives. 
Section  III  considers  the  dangers  that  they  pose.  Section  IV 
recommends  policies  that  preserve the benefits while containing  the 
risks.  Section  V concludes. 
II. THE BENEFICIAL  FUNCTIONS  OF DERIVATIVES 
Derivatives  are financial instruments that derive  their  values 
from  underlying  assets  such  as  stocks,  bonds,  or  foreign 
currencies.  Examples  of  derivatives  include  options,  swaps, 
foreign  exchange  forwards, and inverse floaters.  Table  1 provides 3 
a brief  definition  of several derivatives. 
Derivatives  are traded both on organized  exchanges  and  in an 
over-the-counter  (OTC) market.  Organized  exchanges  enforce  rules 
and provide  clearinghouse  guarantees  that ensure that one party  is 
paid  off  if the counterparty  defaults.  OTC trading,  on the other 
hand,  does  not  provide  guarantees  of  the  financial  integrity  of 
each transaction. 
Derivatives  can  perform  several  useful  functions  for  the 
economy.  These  include hedging market risks, increasing  the value 
of firms,  improving the efficiency of price signals, and increasing 
the profitability  of the banking  system. 
The risk  that market  prices will  change before  a transaction 
takes  place  is pervasive.  Farmers  might  find  that  the  price  of 
wheat  has  fallen  between  the  time  they  plant  and  the  time  they 
harvest.  Organizers  of a tour group to Europe might  find that the 
dollar  has  depreciated  between the time they sell tickets  and the 
time  that  the  tour  takes  place.  Homebuilders  might  find  that 
mortgage  rates have risen between the time they start building  and 
the  time  they  try  to  sell  the  houses.  Derivative  assets  allow 
these  economic  agents  to  lock-in  fixed prices  or rates  now,  thus 
providing  insurance  against  adverse  movements  in asset  markets  in 
the future.  This frees them to focus on their primary  businesses. 
Given  the  dizzying  volatility  in interest  rates,  exchange  rates, 
and other asset 
against  market 
businesses. 
prices in the 1980s and 199Os, the ability  to hedge 
risks  in  this  way  has  become  essential  to  many 4 
Derivatives  also allow the risks from a given cash flow to be 
unbundled,  thereby  increasing  the value  of the underlying  asset. 
For  instance,  a  30-year  bond  ordinarily  pays  the  holder  a  fixed 
percentage  of  the  principal  (a  coupon)  twice  a  year  and  the 
principal  itself after 30 years.  However,  it can be broken  into 60 
coupons  plus  the  principle,  all of which  can be  sold  separately. 
This  decoupling  increases  value  by  permitting  individuals  who 
prefer  risks of different durations to purchase the risks that they 
prefer.  This  is  similar  to  a  situation  where  a  family  desires 
chicken  legs  and  breasts  and  a pet  food  company  desires  chicken 
gizzards  and  other  parts.  If  each  can  only  purchase  the  whole 
chicken,  then each will be purchasing  some parts  that  they do not 
desire.  By unbundling  the chicken into component parts and selling 
each component  to the customer that desires that part, the value of 
the  chicken  is  increased.'  Similarly,  by breaking  the  cash  flow 
from  an asset  into component  parts, the value  of the cash  flow is 
increased.  When  the underlying  cash flow is generated  by a firm, 
the  use  of  derivative  assets  to  unbundle  risks  in  this  way  can 
increase  shareholder  value. 
The  use  of  derivatives  and  computer-assisted  valuation 
strategies  also aids in the pricing of assets.  In a market  economy 
asset prices  and interest rates serve as signals that help channel 
savings  to their most  profitable  uses.  An  increase  in the demand 
for houses  due,  for instance,  to a change  in the age-structure  of 
the population,  will increase the mortgage  interest rate.  This, in 
turn,  will  cause  more  funds  to  flow  into  the  mortgage  market. 5 
However,  there  is considerable  evidence  that  market  prices  do not 
merely  reflect  such  fundamental  factors.*  Computer-assisted 
strategies  allow  investors  to 
prices  that  are  inconsistent 
assets  that  are  underpriced 
overpriced,  these  strategies 
fundamental  values. 
For  instance,  consider  an 
pinpoint  interest  rates  and  asset 
with  fundamentals.  By  purchasing 
or  short-selling  assets  that  are 
move  asset  prices  towards  their 
example  discussed  by Trent  (1994). 
Because  of greater  risk,  the yield on mortgage-backed  securities 
should  pay  a  premium  (historically  1.0%)  above  the  yield  on 
Treasury  bonds.  This  risk  premium  can  be  measured  using 
derivatives  and  computer  models.  When  the  yields  on  mortgage- 
backeds  exceeds  the yield  on Treasuries  by more  than this premium, 
traders  using  computer-assisted  valuation  strategies  enter  the 
market,  purchasing  mortgage-backeds  and short-selling  Treasuries. 
These  actions  tend  to  push  the  yields  back  towards  their 
equilibrium  values  that  reflect  fundamental  factors. 
Derivatives  can  also  help  increase  the  profitability  of  the 
banking  system.  Commercial  banks have historically  made  a profit 
on the spread between  the interest they receive  from assets such as 
loans  and  the  interest  they  pay on  liabilities  such  as deposits. 
The  fact  that  bank  assets  were  often  in  fixed  rate  long  term 
instruments  while  bank liabilities were in interest  rate-sensitive 
short-term  instruments  caused bank profits to erode when short-term 
interest  rates  rose,  as they did  in the  late  seventies  and  early 
eighties.  The  competition  from  security  firms  and  pension  funds 6 
and  the  tendency  for borrowers  to  interact  directly  with  lenders 
decreased  the spread between  loans and deposits  and further  eroded 
bank profitability.  The difficulty  that banks encountered  in their 
traditional  lines  of business  mean  that  they  need  new  sources  of 
profits.  By  engaging  in  derivatives  transactions,  either  as 
dealers  for other  end-users  or in proprietary  trades  for their  own 
accounts,  banks  have  the  potential  to  increase  profitability. 
Derivatives  can thus perform many beneficial  functions.  They 
are  a  technological  innovation,  analogous  to  electricity  or  the 
automobile.  They  can be used  to hedge  against  changes  in market 
prices,  increase  the  value  of  firms,  improve  the  efficiency  of 
price  signals,  and  increase  the  profitability  of  the  banking 
system.  However,  just  as  electricity  or  automobiles  can  be 
dangerous,  derivatives  when  misused  can be perilous. 
III. THE DANGERS  OF DERIVATIVES 
The experience  of Barings Bank and Proctor  & Gamble underscore 
the  dangers  of  derivatives.  Derivative  instruments  frequently 
employ  complex  mathematics  and  sophisticated  computer  technology 
that  senior  managers  are  unable  to  understand.  As  long  as 
derivatives  operations  generate  profits,  managers  often  adopt 
strategies  of benign  neglect  towards  them.  Thus,  as Meyer  (1995) 
related,  Barings  managers  sent $550 million to a Singapore  exchange 
when  a  27-year  old  trader  requested  it.  Soon  thereafter,  this 
trader's  contracts  destroyed  the  bank.  Derivatives  also  permit 
investors  to take  on a great  deal of risk without  putting  up much 7 
money.  When  asset  prices  are volatile,  this  ability  to  leverage 
can  cause  traders  to  lose many  times  their  initial  investments. 
Thus,  as Loomis  (1995) discussed,  Proctor  & Gamble  used  swaps  and 
options  to  attempt  to  reduce  its  borrowing  rate  from  3.25%  to 
2.85%.  When  its option  contracts  became  "in the money,t1 Proctor 
was  locked  in to paying  an interest  rate of 18.9 percent  over the 
next  four  and a half years. 
While these incidents indicate that derivatives  are risky, the 
losses  described  in  these  examples  primarily  affected  the 
stockholders  of  the  company.  In  a  capitalist  economy,  those 
purchasing  stocks  know  that  they  are accepting  risk.  Since  they 
will  be  the  ones  who  lose  the  most  if  the  value  of  the  stock 
decreases,  they  have  the  greatest  incentive  to monitor  the  risks 
(including  derivative  risks)  that  the  company  accepts.  Through 
demands  on managers  and directors  for greater vigilance  and better 
risk  management  practices,  through  voting,  and through  lawsuits, 
shareholders  can  help  control  a  firm's  exposure  to  derivatives 
risk. 
A  more  serious  concern  for  the  economy  as  a  whole  is  the 
systemic  risk  caused  by  derivatives  trading.  The  Bank  for 
International  Settlements  (BIS),  quoted  in  Edwards  (1994,  5), 
defines  systemic  risk as follows: 
Systemic  Risk:  The risk that a disruption  (at a firm, 
in a market  segment,  to a settlement  system,  etc.) 
causes  widespread  difficulties  at other  firms,  in other 8 
market  segments  or  in the  financial  system  as a whole. 
The  BIS  also  states  that  a systemic  risk  can  trigger  a  systemic 
crisis,  in  which  credit  allocation,  payments,  or  the  pricing  of 
financial  assets  is impaired. 
Historical  examples  of systemic  crises  come  from  the banking 
panics  that frequently  occurred  in the U.S. until the  1930s.  These 
panics  occurred  when  large  numbers  of depositors  at several  banks 
suddenly  sought  to withdraw  funds.  Many banks had to quickly  sell 
assets.  Because  markets  for  these  assets  were  not  sufficiently 
liquid  to  handle  massive  selling,  assets  often  sold  at  deep 
discounts,  forcing  some  banks  into  insolvency.  These  insolvent 
banks  then  had  difficulty  paying  counterparties,  causing  some  of 
them  to  go  into  bankruptcy.  During  these  crises,  the 
convertibility  of  deposits  to  currency  by  banks  was  often 
suspended. 
As  discussed  by Greenspan 
which  derivatives  could  pose 
(1994), potential  channels  through 
systemic  risks  occur  if  credit 
exposures  are too concentrated  among a few dealers,  if derivatives 
markets  are  illiquid,  or  if derivatives  quickly  transmit  shocks 
from  one  market  to  another.  The danger  of credit  exposure  among 
dealers  occurs  because  dealers  largely trade  OTC  derivatives  with 
each  other,  and by avoiding  an organized  exchange  they also forego 
clearinghouse  guarantees  that ensure that one party  is paid off if 
the  counterparty  defaults.  By trading  so heavily  with  each other 
outside  of organized  exchanges,  the probability  is increased  that 9 
a default  by one  firm will  causes  losses  and possible  defaults  by 
other  firms,  threatening  the  stability  of  the  financial  system. 
The  danger  of  illiquid  derivatives  markets  is  that  hedging 
strategies  could  fail  if assets  held  to  offset  risks  can  not  be 
sold or can only be sold at deep discounts.  This  in turn can cause 
firms to become  insolvent  and spread losses to counterparties.  The 
danger  of  closer  linkages  between  markets  is that  a  failure  of a 
major  financial  firm anywhere  in the world could affect  and perhaps 
imperil  other  firms  throughout  the world. 
The Government  Accounting  Office  (GAO) is especially  concerned 
about  the  danger  of a systemic  crisis.  The  GAO  (1994, 7) stated: 
The  combination  of global  involvement,  concentration,  and 
linkages  means  that the sudden  failure  of any of these 
large  dealers  could  cause  liquidity  problems  in the 
markets  and could  also pose risks to the  others,  including 
federally  insured  banks and the financial  system  as a 
whole. 
The GAO  further  warned  that these dangers  escalate  during  times  of 
financial  stress.  While  the  GAO  acknowledged  that  federal 
regulators  have  usually  prevented  financial  stress  from producing 
crises,  they  noted  that  it  has  often  been  at  the  expense  of 
taxpayer-financed  loans or bailouts. 
One source of systemic risk could occur due to the squeeze  for 
profits  in  the  highly  competitive  financial  services  industry. 10 
This  might  induce  several  firms  to  take  unwise  risks.  As  Gorton 
and  Rosen  (1995)  have  discussed,  if  several  derivatives  firms 
undertake  similar  positions,  then  the  failure  of  one  firm  can 
trigger  the  failure  of others. 
In addition  to the systemic  risks  posed  by derivatives  there 
are other dangers.  The complexity  and opaqueness  of some over-the- 
counter  derivatives  contracts  can  facilitate  cheating  by 
unscrupulous  dealers.  Proctor & Gamble,  as quoted  in Loomis  (1995, 
P-  62)  complained  that  the  value  of  its  derivative  assets  with 
Bankers  Trust  was  determined  by  a  "secret,  proprietary,  complex, 
multivariable  pricing  modeltt  which  it did not have  access  to.  In 
its dealing  with Gibson Greetings,  Bankers Trust admits to lying by 
telling  Gibson  that  it had  lost a lot less money  than  it actually 
had,  causing  Gibson  to continue  to hold  its position  and  lose even 
more. 
Derivative  assets  also allow managers  to short-sell  stock  in 
the  companies  they  manage,  giving  them  an  incentive  to  decrease 
shareholder  value.  As Norris  (1995) reports,  a CEO arranged  a deal 
with Lehman  Brothers  by which he would receive a check for millions 
of dollars  if the price of his company's  stock fell and pay a check 
for  millions  of  dollars  if  the  stock  price  increased.  It  is 
illegal  for  a  corporate  insider  to  directly  go  short  in  the 
corporation's  stock.  However,  through  the use of derivatives,  an 
insider  can effectively  do the same thing.  In this case, the worse 
the  company's  stock  performs,  the more  the CEO profits. 11 
IV. POLICY  RESPONSES  TO PRESERVE  THE BENEFITS  OF DERIVATIVES  AND 
CONTAIN  THE RISKS 
Certain  policy  responses  are  obvious,  while  others  are 
controversial. 
company  he  or 
removing  legal 
obvious  policy 
Restricting  a CEO from selling  short  stock  in the 
she  manages,  improving 
uncertainties  between 
responses.  Regulating 
all  OTC  derivatives  dealers  is  a 
response. 
accounting  techniques,  and 
countries  are  some  of  the 
the  safety  and  soundness  of 
more  controversial  policy 
If a CEO uses derivatives  to effectively  go short in the stock 
of the company  that he or she manages,  then the manager's  incentive 
is  to  decrease  shareholder  value.  Such  an  arrangement  is 
nonsensical.  The  laws forbidding  corporate  insiders  from shorting 
their  company's  stock should be extended  to prohibit  insiders  from 
using  derivatives  to effectively  go short. 
Adequate  disclosure  of derivatives  transactions  in a  firm's 
annual  statement  is  necessary  for  shareholders  to  monitor  the 
firm's  exposure  to  derivatives.  These  shareholders,  who  own  the 
company,  have the greatest  incentive to ensure that  these  risks are 
not  excessive.  Unfortunately,  the  complexity  of  derivatives 
transactions  makes  it  hard  to  agree  on  one  simple,  consistent 
accounting  framework  for  them.  Government  officials  should 
continue  to push the Financial Accounting  Standards  Board and other 
interested  parties  to develop  consistent  accounting  standards  for 
disclosing  derivatives  risks. 
Also,  as the  Bankers  Trust  cases with  Gibson  Greeting  Cards 12 
and  Proctor  & Gamble  indicate,  transparency  between  dealers  and 
end-users  is  important.  Dishonest  behavior  is  likely  when  the 
value of an end-user's  derivative  assets is determined  by a secret, 
complex  pricing  model which only the dealer has access to and when 
the  dealer  gains  from the  end-user's  losses.  The  requirement  on 
Bankers  Trust  to disclose  to customers  "every  wart,  wrinkle,  and 
whisker  of  their  leveraged  derivatives  contra&l1  (Loomis,  1995, 
p.60)  and  to  reveal  to  customers  on  a  daily  basis  a  contract's 
value would probably be good standards for the industry.  Given the 
enormous  competition  for limited profits in the financial  services 
industry,  the  temptation  to cheat  is inevitable.  By eliminating 
obfuscation  wherever  possible  this temptation  is attenuated. 
Another  policy  response  that would reduce  the systemic  risks 
posed by derivatives  would be to remove legal uncertainties  between 
the  U.S.  and  other  countries,  especially  countries  with  less 
developed  bankruptcy  laws.  An important uncertainty  to be resolved 
is whether  a dealer's  credit exposure to a counterparty  in another 
country  should be calculated  on a net or a gross basis.  Exposures 
between  two parties  in the U.S. are now calculated  on a net basis. 
To understand  why the distinction  between net and gross exposure  is 
important  consider  a situation  in which party  A in the U.S.  has a 
liability  towards  party  B  in  another  country  for  $97  million 
dollars  and party  B has a corresponding  liability  towards  party  A 
for $100 million.  If party B goes bankrupt, A's  $100 million  will 
be at jeopardy.  But it is possible that the bankruptcy  laws in B's 
country  are such that A will still have to pay the $97 million  that 13 
it owes  B, with  the money  going  to preferred  creditors.  In this 
case,  A  would  not  only  lose  the  $3 million  differential  between 
what  it owes  B and what  it is owed by B but  also the  $97 million 
that it owes B.  If the laws are such that exposures  are calculated 
on a net  basis,  then A  can subtract  B's  liability  ($100 million) 
before  having  to pay B what  it owes  ($97 million).  In this case A 
would only lose $3 million  if B defaults.  Thus, if credit exposure 
is calculated  on a net basis,  it is less likely that a default  by 
one  firm  will  causes  defaults  by  other  firms  and  in  this  way 
threaten  the  stability  of the financial  system. 
The  General  Accounting  Office  (1994)  has  demanded  tighter 
regulation  of  all  derivatives  dealers  to  reduce  the  danger  of  a 
systemic  crisis.  They  argued  that there  are  significant  gaps  in 
derivatives  regulation.  The  derivatives  activities  of  security 
firms and insurance companies in particular  are largely exempt from 
Federal  oversight.  The GAO stated that there  is an immediate  need 
for Congress  to close the gap.  It recommended  that Congress  ensure 
that these  firms  set aside sufficient  capital  to withstand  losses 
due  to  derivatives  trading,  that these  firms  implement  effective 
internal  risk  management  methods,  and  that  they  report  credit 
exposures  to  regulators.  The  GAO  also  expressed  concern  about 
commercial  banks  using  taxpayer-insured  deposits  to  invest  in 
derivatives  for their own accounts. 
Greenspan  (1994), responding  to the GAO report,  rejected  the 
need  for new  regulation.  He argued  that  regulation  could  create 
the  mistaken  expectation  that  federal  regulation  will  remove  the 14 
risk  from derivatives  activities.  He argued  that these  risks  are 
best regulated  by private parties, subject to the discipline  of the 
marketplace.  He  stated  that  the voluntary  minimum  standards  for 
conduct  in derivatives  businesses being developed by the Securities 
and  Exchange  Commission  and  derivatives  dealers  should  help 
strengthen  the market disciplines  already  in place.  If these were 
not enough  and a derivatives  dealer did fail, he claimed  that this 
would not put the Bank Insurance Fund at risk.  Bank balance  sheets 
are constantly  monitored  by Federal regulators  to ensure  that they 
do not  have  too  large an exposure  to any one derivatives  dealer. 
Greenspan  also argued  that the risks of banks  investing  their  own 
funds  in derivatives  is not greater than the risks associated  with 
other  banking  activities.  Every  fixed-rate  home  mortgage,  he 
stated,  has  a difficult-to-manage  option  embedded  in  it.  Thus 
Greenspan  downplayed  the need for greater government  regulation  of 
the derivatives  market. 
To choose between the arguments of the GAO and Greenspan  there 
is  a  need  for  more  facts.  How  vulnerable  are  large  dealers  to 
common risk factors such as interest rate or exchange rate changes? 
How have  they  improved their  in-house risk management  techniques? 
How  concentrated  are  their  credit  exposures  to  counterparties? 
Are firms using exchange-traded  instruments taking risks that could 
endanger  a  clearinghouse?  Do  CEOs  understand  the  derivatives 
contracts  entered  into by the  company?  Much of the evidence  that 
we  have  on  these  and  similar  questions  have  been  obtained  from 
surveys  (e.g., the GAO  (1994)).  The problem with  surveys  is that 15 
economic  agents  do  not  have  an  incentive  to  be  entirely 
forthcoming.  A proposal by Eugene Rotberg  (1995), former Treasurer 
at  the  World  Bank,  would  provide  more  useful  information.  He 
suggested  that  major  players  in  the  derivatives  market  be 
questioned  under  oath  in a non-adversarial  setting.  Lawyers  or 
others  skilled  at  obtaining  facts  could  ask  many  questions 
concerning  their derivatives  operations.  These facts could then be 
provided  to  economists,  regulators,  and policy  makers,  who  could 
use  them  to  more  accurately  gauge  the  systemic  risks  posed  by 
derivatives  trading. 
While  derivatives  dealers and others would argue that such an 
investigation  is unnecessary,  the complexity  of these  instruments, 
their  novelty  (and consequently  our limited experience  concerning 
their  systemic  effects),  and the brutal quickness  with  which  they 
can  destroy  firms  justifies  such  a  response.  In  approving 
medicines  for human use, the hypothesis  that the drug  is dangerous 
must  be  rejected  at  a  probability  level  much  lower  than  the  5 
percent  level often used in statistical  tests. A similar principle 
should apply to derivatives  regulation.  Since a strong prima  facia 
case  has  been  made  by  the  GAO  and  others  that  these  instruments 
pose  systemic  risks,  a  thorough  study  is  necessary  before 
complacently  accepting  the argument that they are innocuous.  Such 
a study  is of particular  moment  at present  since,  as Allen  (1995) 
reported,  derivatives  users  have  shifted  into  less  profitable 
instruments,  increasing  the profit squeeze on financial  firms.  If 
they respond  to this squeeze by greater risk-taking  and if several 16 
derivatives  firms undertake  similar positions,  then the decline  in 
profitability  in derivatives  trading can increase systematic  risks. 
Greenspan  may be correct  that these and other systemic  risks posed 
by derivatives  are minimal.  However,  it could  not hurt to obtain 
another  opinion  based  on carefully  collected  facts. 
Until  such  facts  are  available,  all  parties  agree  that  in- 
house risk management  is essential  to  minimizing  the systemic risks 
of  derivatives.  Senior  managers  and  boards  of  directors  should 
know and authorize  the amount of risk a firm is exposed  to through 
derivatives.  They should use computer models to determine  how much 
capital  is necessary  to shield the firm from possible  losses due to 
derivatives.  In conducting  such simulations,  they should not only 
perform  atheoretical  stress  testing  (e.g.,  how  their  portfolio 
responds  to a drop  in the exchange  rate) but also consider  likely 
macroeconomic  scenarios  (e.g., how their  portfolio  responds  when 
the Fed raises  interest  rates, which would  simultaneously  depress 
stock  prices  and  appreciate  the  dollar).  The  firm's  credit 
exposure  to  any  limited  set  of  counterparties  should  also  be 
monitored. 
Pressure  for  such  an  approach  is  already  developing  from 
several sources.  Commercial banks are now required  to use computer 
models  to determine  the amount  of capital to set aside to cushion 
against  derivatives  risks.3  Shareholders,  awakened  to the dangers 
of derivatives  by the Proctor & Gamble and Barings  Bank disasters, 
are  demanding  better  risk  management  procedures.  The  Securities 
and  Exchange  Commission  has persuaded  the six  largest  securities 17 
firms  to  voluntarily  adopt  stronger  risk-management  techniques. 
Congress,  by using the threat of regulation,  could probably  induce 
the  other  major  players  in the  derivatives  market  to  also  adopt 
better  risk management  techniques. 
The issue of commercial  banks using taxpayer-insured  deposits 
to invest  in derivatives  for their own accounts  is thorny.  It is 
true that banks  need new sources of profits  and that  if derivative 
trading  were  restricted  in  the  U.S.,  this  business  would  flow 
overseas.  Further,  Greenspan  (1994) has also argued that  the  risks 
of banks  investing  their  own funds  in derivatives  is not  greater 
than  the  risks  associated  with  other  banking  activities.  Still, 
there  is something  unseemly about investing taxpayer-insured  money 
in complex  derivatives.  While instruments  such as simple  interest 
rate  swaps  are  unobjectionable,  there  is a good  chance  that  more 
complex  instruments  will  be  considered  gambling  and  thus  ruled 
illegal by courts  in certain jurisdictions  (see  Mayer,  1995).  Most 
citizens  would  probably  object  to using  their  taxes  to guarantee 
gambling  activities,  especially  following  the  Savings  and  Loans 
crisis  that  cost  taxpayers  nearly  300 billion  dollars. 
Perhaps  the  best way  to stop taxpayer-insured  deposits  from 
being  channeled  into complex  derivatives  is to make  this  change 
part of an overall  reform of the financial  system.  Major  changes, 
such as the extension  of interstate  banking  and the repeal  of the 
Glass-Steagall  Act, have either already  been enacted  or are about 
to  be.  A  further  reform  which  would  prevent  taxpayer-insured 
deposits  from being  invested in derivatives  is the  institution  of 18 
narrow banking  (see Phillips,  1995).  Under this proposal,  separate 
monetary  service and financial service companies would  be created. 
The  monetary  service  companies  would  offer  demand  deposits  and 
invest  only  in  l'safe"  assets  such  as  short-term  Treasury 
liabilities.  The financial service companies would channel  savings 
to  riskier  investments  including  derivatives.  As  Phillips 
discusses,  such  a  change  would  make  federal  deposit  insurance 
redundant.  Thus,  if  this  reform  were  implemented,  risky 
derivatives  investments  would  cease  to  be protected  by  the  Bank 
Insurance  Fund.  If  narrow  banking  were  not  instituted,  then 
restrictions  on channeling  taxpayer-insured  deposits  into complex 
derivatives  should still be instituted as part of an overall  reform 
of the  financial  system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Financial  derivatives  in 1994 and 1995 have wreaked  havoc  on 
financial  firms,  nonfinancial  firms,  and  municipalities.  The 
devastation  has sparked debate on the proper public policy  response 
to  derivatives.  This  paper  has  made  several  recommendations 
designed  to preserve  the benefits  of derivatives  while  containing 
their risks.  These include restricting  the ability of a CEO to use 
derivatives  to short sell his or her company's stock, improving the 
accounting  framework  used  to  disclose  derivatives  transactions, 
increasing  transparency  between dealers and end-users,  and reducing 
legal uncertainties  between countries.  This paper also argues that 
more  information  is  needed  before  it  will  be  clear  whether  new 19 
legislation  recommended  by  the  GAO  to  regulate  the  safety  and 
soundness  of all OTC  derivatives  dealers  is required.  To  obtain 
this  information  the government  should place  the major  players  in 
the  derivatives  market  under  oath  and  determine  the  level  of 
systemic  risk posed by their derivatives  activities.  Until  such a 
study  has  been  performed,  the government  should  push  dealers  and 
end-users  to improve their  in-house risk management  practices.  By 
threatening  legislation  if  improvements  are  not  made,  Congress 
could probably  persuade the major players in the derivatives  market 
to  institute  such changes. 
Financial  derivatives  represent  technological  breakthroughs 
that  can  be  beneficial  to  the  economy.  But  as  previous 
technological  breakthroughs  such as airplanes  and electricity  had 
dangers,  derivatives  can also be perilous.  Vigilance  and  common 
sense  on  the  part  of  market  participants,  policy  makers, 
regulators,  and citizens  are necessary  to ensure  that derivatives 
go the way  of airplanes  and not the way of zeppelins. 20 
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TABLE 1 
The Maior  Types  of Derivatives 
Derivative  Definition  Example 
Forwards  Forwards  and futures  obligate 
and  the  holder  to  buy  or  sell  a 
futures  specific  amount or value of an 
underlying  asset  (a  stock, 
bond,  currency  or stock price 
index)  at a specified price on 
a  specified  future  date.  A 
future  is  a  standardized 
contract  that  trades  on  an 
exchange;  a  forward  is  a 
specially  designed  and 
negotiated  contract. 
Options 
Swaps 
Options  contracts  grant  their 
purchasers  the right,  but not 
the obligation,  to buy or sell 
a  specific  amount  to  the 
underlying  asset  at  a 
particular  price  within  a 
specified  period. 
Swaps  are  agreements  between 
parties  to  make  specified 
period.  In a simple  interest 
rate  swap,  one  party  makes 
payments  based  on  a  fixed 
interest  rate,  while  the 
counter  party  makes  payments 
based  on a variable rate.  The 
contractual  payments  are  an 
abstraction;  the  interest 
payments  are  not  actually 
exchanged. 
Source:  GAO,  Financial  Derivatives 
A U.S.  importer  promises to 
buy  machinery  at a future  date 
for a price quoted  in  German 
currency.  The  importer  can 
usea  forwardcontract-  or  a 
future  contract,  if one  is 
available  that  meets  the 
company's  needs - to fix the 
dollar cost  of converting  to 
Germancurrencyatthe  future 
date.  Thus, the dollar cost 
of Germancurrency  inCreaSeS 
between  the  purchase  and 
delivery  dates. 
A mutual  fund buys an option 
on a given amount of Treasury 
bills.  The fund will benefit 
if the price of the Treasury 
bills  moves  in a  favorable 
direction.  If  thepricemoves 
inanunfavorabledirection, 
the fund will lose  the price 
paid  for the option. 
A  bank  has  a  portfolio  of 
loans  whose  floating  rates 
must be adjusted  frequently 
because  they  are  tied  to 
changes  in market  interest 
rates.  The  bank  also  has 
deposits  that  pay customers  at 
rates  that  are  adjusted 
infrequently.  This bankhas 
interest rate risk, because a 
decline  in  interest  rates 
reduces the interest  receipts 
on  its  loans  but  not  the  ‘I 
interest  payments  the  bank 
must  pay  depositors. The bank 
may  enter  into an interest 
rate  swap  with  another 
financial  institution  to  hedge 
its interest  rate  risk. 23 
NOTES 
* Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of Bard College,  Post Office  Box 
5000,  Annandale-on-Hudson,  NY  12504-5000.  I  acknowledge  my 
indebtedness  to  the  writings  of  Alan  Greenspan  and  the  General 
Accounting  Office. 
1.  This  analogy  is due to Edward Kane. 
2.  While  some academics  believe that asset prices  solely  reflect 
fundamentals,  powerful  evidence that it does not comes from the 19 
October  1987  stock market  crash.  Stock prices  lost 20 percent  of 
their value  in one day in the absence of any clear news  indicating 
that  fundamentals  had changed. 
3.  Banks  also  have  the  option  to  use  the  "building  block*' 
approach  developed  by the Basle  Committee  on Bank  Supervision  in 
determining  the  amount  of  capital  to  set  aside  for  derivatives 
risks.  Since  this  results  in considerably  more  capital  being  set 
aside then when  banks use their own models,  large banks are opting 
to develop  their  own models. 